Efficient Secure Outsourcing of Large-Scale Linear Systems of Equations

Sergio Salinas, Changqing Luo, Xuhui Chen, and Pan Li
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Mississippi State University, Mississippi State, MS 39762
Email: {sas573, cl1349, xc126, li@ece.msstate.edu

Abstract—Solving large-scale linear systems of equations (LSEs) is one of the most common and fundamental problems in big data. But such problems are often too expensive to solve for resource-limited users. Cloud computing has been proposed as a timely, efficient, and cost-effective way of solving such computing tasks. Nevertheless, one critical concern in cloud computing is data privacy. To be more prominent, in many cases, clients’s LSEs contain private data that should remain hidden from the cloud for ethical, legal, or security reasons. Many previous works on secure outsourcing of LSEs have high computational complexity. More importantly, they share a common serious problem, i.e., a huge number of external memory I/O operations. This problem has been largely neglected in the past, but in fact is of particular importance and may eventually render those outsourcing schemes impractical. In this paper, we develop an efficient and practical secure outsourcing algorithm for solving large-scale LSEs, which has both low computational complexity and low memory I/O complexity and can protect clients’ privacy well. We implement our algorithm on a real-world cloud server and a laptop. We find that the proposed algorithm offers significant time savings for the client (up to 65%) compared to previous algorithms.

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, many large-scale systems and applications have emerged which deal with huge volumes of data. For example, social networks need to monitor and record interactions among millions or billions of users [1] [2]; scientists need to sequence the genome of complex organisms [3]; and power system operators collect enormous amounts of data from the electric grid for real-time monitoring and offline analysis [4]. Due to advances in computer memory, large-scale data sets can be stored in a cost-effective manner. However, analyzing them requires extensive computing resources which are usually very expensive capital investments. Therefore, both individuals and organizations face a formidable challenge in trying to analyze large-scale data sets in a timely and cost-effective way. This challenge has attracted significant attention from industry, academia and governments, who have identified it as a new technology field, called Big Data [5], [6].

Solving large-scale linear systems of equations (LSEs) of the form $A\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{b}$ is one of the most common and fundamental problems in big data. But such problems are often too expensive to solve for resource-limited users. Some researchers and companies suggest cloud computing as a new way of solving such computing tasks [7]–[11]. In cloud computing, clients outsource their computing tasks to the cloud, which contains a large amount of computing resources and offers them on a pay-per-use basis [12]. In this computing paradigm, clients share the cloud resources with each other, and avoid purchasing, installing, and maintaining sophisticated and expensive computing hardware and software.

Nevertheless, one critical concern in cloud computing is data privacy. To be more prominent, in many cases, client’s LSEs contain private data that should remain hidden from the cloud for ethical, legal, or security reasons. For example, a person’s genome could be disclosed by a computing task from a health-care provider [5]; a company’s data set may reveal proprietary processes, which are an attractive target for corporate espionage; or data from power system operators contain information that can be exploited to attack the electric grid [13]. Thus, in order for people to really adopt cloud computing, we have to design tools and technologies that allow clients to outsource the computing of their LSEs to the cloud while preserving the privacy of their data. The fact that clients lack computing and storage resources also limits the complexity of operations that they can perform to hide their data from the cloud, which makes secure outsourcing an even more challenging problem.

Some previous works on securely outsourcing computing tasks to the cloud could be used to solve LSEs. However, they suffer from high computing requirements. In [14], Gennaro et al. utilize fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to securely outsource computations to the cloud. Although the scheme is very attractive and offers theoretical privacy guarantees, FHE itself is a computationally intensive operation, and large-scale computations based on FHE ciphertexts are very expensive, even for the cloud. Wang et al. [15] [16] propose methods to privately outsource a linear programming problem. A client may employ these methods to find the solution to an LSE by requesting the cloud to solve a special linear program. Unfortunately, to protect data privacy, the client needs to perform a matrix-matrix multiplication that is prohibitively expensive because this operation has a computational complexity of $O(n^\rho)$ for $2 < \rho \leq 3$ (for $n \times n$ matrices).

Recently a few secure outsourcing algorithms have been developed specifically for solving LSEs. Lei et al. [17] and Atallah et al. [18] design secure matrix inversion algorithms.
that use matrix permutations to preserve data privacy. To find the solution to an LSE, a client performs operations with \(O(n^2)\) complexity. Wang et al. [19] develop an iterative algorithm specifically to solve LSEs, where a client transforms and encrypts the coefficient matrix using homomorphic encryption, and the cloud carries out computations on ciphertexts. Specifically, the client needs to perform two matrix-vector multiplications, which require \(O(n^2)\) floating-point (flops) operations, and \(O(n^2)\) homomorphic encryptions. Note that performing homomorphic encryptions has high computational complexity \(O(\log_2 e)\) flops per encrypted value, where \(e\) is the key size). Although it is proposed that the client could outsource this computation to a trusted third-party, it may not always exist. The use of homomorphic encryption also forces the cloud to operate on ciphertexts, which then has to use specialized linear algebra software and performs operations with higher computational complexity. Besides, the proposed algorithm only works for LSEs whose coefficient matrices are diagonally dominant, and the privacy will be compromised if the number of iterations approaches or exceeds \(n\). Later on, Chen et al. [20] also propose similar solutions to outsourcing linear programs and LSEs while preserving users’ privacy. We notice that most such works’ computational complexities are still high.

More importantly, previous works [17]–[20] share a common serious problem, i.e., a huge number of external memory I/O operations. This problem has been largely neglected in the previous secure outsourcing algorithm design. But we stress that the number of times an algorithm accesses a matrix is of particular importance for outsourcing a large-scale LSE and can eventually render the algorithm impractical. The reason is as follows. Most often a client lacks enough RAM memory to store a large-scale matrix completely at once. So, instead of working on RAM memory directly, as is the case with smaller matrices, the client can only load a small section of the large-scale matrix at a time and write the results to external memory when it is done. However, reading and writing operations from and into external memory have a very high latency compared to the same operations in RAM. For example, our experiments show that reading a matrix once with dimension 30,000 \(\times\) 30,000 and size 10GB on a laptop that has 4GB RAM and a hard disk at 5400RPM would take about 15 minutes. Therefore, any practical algorithm for large-scale LSEs should only incur as small the number of memory I/O operations for the client as possible. To better capture the special external memory I/O requirement of large-scale LSEs, we propose a new definition of “external memory I/O complexity”, which is the number of values that are read/written from/into external memory. In this paper, we call it “memory I/O complexity” for brevity. Previous works have very high memory I/O complexity. For example, a client needs to access the elements of a matrix many times in [17]–[19], which may take an unacceptably long time due to the latency of the huge number of I/O operations in practice.

Aiming to reduce both computational and memory I/O complexities, in this paper, we develop an efficient and practical secure outsourcing algorithm for solving large-scale LSEs. Specifically, to protect its data privacy, a client generates a random matrix to transform the original coefficient matrix \(A\) into matrix \(\hat{A}\) via a matrix addition. We prove that matrix \(\hat{A}\) is computationally indistinguishable from a random matrix. Then, based on the conjugate gradient method, the client finds the solution vector \(x\) iteratively with the help of the cloud. Since the client delegates expensive matrix-vector operations to the cloud, it has computational complexity of \(O(n^2)\). Besides, it has very low memory I/O complexity of \(4n^2 + 4n\). The algorithm preserves the privacy of the client, i.e., hides \(A, x,\) and \(b\), by letting the cloud operate on the transformed matrix \(\hat{A}\) and some intermediate values, rather than on \(A, x,\) or \(b\). Moreover, since matrix \(\hat{A}\) is the result of a linear algebra operation, the cloud can use traditional linear algebra software, and avoid the costly exponentiations required for ciphertext-based operations as in [19].

We summarize our main contributions as follows.

- We develop an efficient and practical algorithm to securely outsource the computation of large-scale LSEs.
- The proposed algorithm requires operations with low computational and storage complexities from the client. In particular, the computational complexity is \(O(n^2)\) and the memory I/O complexity is \(4n^2 + 4n\) read/write operations. We compare both complexities of our algorithm with those of previous algorithms and find that our algorithm is much more efficient.
- We show that the cloud is unable to obtain any information about the client’s LSE. Different from [19] where privacy can only be protected if the algorithm converges in fewer than \(n\) iterations, the privacy in our algorithm can be protected no matter how many iterations are needed.
- We implement our algorithm on a real-world cloud server and a laptop. We find that the proposed algorithm offers significant time savings for the client (up to 65%) compared to previous algorithms.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the considered system architecture and threat model. Section III describes the proposed privacy-preserving matrix transformation. Section IV presents in detail the proposed algorithm for secure outsourcing of LSEs, while Section V analyzes the computational complexity, storage complexity, and privacy of the proposed algorithm. We present our experimental results in Section VI, and conclude the paper in Section VII.

II. Problem Formulation

In this section, we present the system architecture considered in this paper, and introduce the threat model.

A. System Architecture

We consider an asymmetric two-party computing architecture as shown in Fig. 1, where a cloud client (CC) is resource-limited while a remote cloud server (CS) has abundant computing resources. The CC intends to solve a large-scale computing task, but cannot complete it on its own. So the CC offloads the
most expensive computations to the CS and collaborates with it to find the solution to the large-scale LSE. In this work, we concentrate on the computing task of finding the solution to a large-scale LSE:

$$Ax = b$$  (1)

where $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n} \ (m \geq n)$ is a full rank coefficient matrix, $x \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}$ is the solution vector, and $b \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times 1}$ is the constant vector. We assume that $A$, $x$, and $b$ contain, or could reveal private information of the CC.

**B. Threat Model**

We assume a malicious threat model for the CS. That is, the CS tries to extract information from the CC’s data and from the results of its own computations, and may attempt to deviate from the proposed protocols and return erroneous results. Besides, we assume that the CS knows the form of the LSE as described in (1) and our proposed secure outsourcing algorithm as well.

To enable the CC to securely delegate computing tasks to the CS, the data that the CC shares with the CS should appear random. This notion of privacy is known as computational indistinguishability [21], and is defined as follows.

**Definition 1.** Computational Indistinguishability: Two probability ensembles $X = \{X_s\}_{s \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $Y = \{Y_s\}_{s \in \mathbb{N}}$, are computationally indistinguishable if for every probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher $D$ there exists a negligible function $\mu(\cdot)$ such that

$$|Pr[D(X_s) = 1] - Pr[D(Y_s) = 1]| < \mu$$  (2)

where the notation $D(X_s)$ (or $D(Y_s)$) means that $x$ (or $y$) is chosen according to distribution $X_s$ (or $Y_s$) and then $D(x)$ (or $D(y)$) is run.

Moreover, this definition can be extended to the case where a distinguisher $D$ has access to multiple samples of the vectors $X$ and $Y$, i.e., when comparing two matrices.

**Definition 2.** Let $R \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ be a random matrix with entries in its $j$th column sampled from a uniform distribution with interval $[-R_j, R_j]$ $\forall j \in [1, n]$. Matrices $R$ and $Q \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ are computationally indistinguishable if for any probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher $D(\cdot)$ there exists a negligible function $\mu(\cdot)$ such that

$$|Pr[D(r_{i,j}) = 1] - Pr[D(q_{i,j}) = 1]| \leq \mu$$  (3)

where $i \in [1, m]$, $j \in [1, n]$, $r_{i,j}$ is the element in the $i$th row and $j$th column of $R$, and $q_{i,j}$ is the element in the $i$th row and $j$th column of $Q$. Distinguisher $D(\cdot)$ outputs 1 when it identifies the input as a non-uniform distribution in the range $[-R_j, R_j]$, and zero otherwise.

**III. A PRIVACY-PRESERVING MATRIX TRANSFORMATION**

Before delving into details about our proposed algorithm for outsourcing large-scale LSEs, we first present a privacy-preserving matrix transformation scheme.

To delegate a computing task to the CS, the CC first needs to perform some computations on its data. These computations should hide the data from the CS, require light computational effort from the CS, and at the same time allow the CS to return a meaningful result. To this end, we design a lightweight privacy-preserving matrix transformation based on matrix addition that offers computational indistinguishability, that is, a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm is unable to differentiate between the transformed matrix and a random matrix with non-negligible probability.

In particular, the CC hides its private information in the coefficient matrix $A$ by applying a matrix addition as follows:

$$\hat{A} = A + Z$$  (4)

where $Z \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ is a random matrix, and $\hat{a}_{i,j} = a_{i,j} + z_{i,j}$ $\forall i \in [1, m]$, $j \in [1, n]$ where $a_{i,j}$ is the element in the $i$th row and $j$th column of $A$. We assume that the values of matrix $A$ are within the range $[-K, K]$, where $K = 2^l$ ($l > 0$) is a positive constant.

To reduce the CC’s computational complexity, the random matrix $Z$ is formed by a vector outer-product, i.e.,

$$Z = uv^T$$  (5)

where $u \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times 1}$ is a vector of uniformly distributed random variables with probability density functions as follows:

$$f_U(u_i) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2c} & -c < u_i < c \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where $c = 2^p$ ($p > 0$) is a positive constant, and $i \in [1, m]$. Vector $v \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}$ is a vector of arbitrary positive constants ranging from $2^q$ and $2^{q+q}$ ($q > 0$).

Note that element $z_{i,j} = u_i v_j$ $\forall i \in [1, m]$, $j \in [1, n]$ of matrix $Z$ is the product of a random variable and a positive constant. Thus, $z_{i,j}$ is also a random variable with its probability density function defined as [22]:

$$f_Z(z_{i,j}) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2L_j} & -L_j < z_{i,j} < L_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
where \( L_j = cv_j \) (\( \forall j \in [1,n] \)) and hence is between \( 2^{p+1} \) and \( 2^{p+l+q} \). We can now arrive at a theorem about the computational indistinguishability between \( \hat{A} \) and a matrix with columns filled with values taken from uniform distributions.

**Theorem 1.** Let \( R \) be a random matrix with entries in its \( j \)th column sampled from a uniform distribution with interval \([-L_j, L_j] \) (\( \forall j \in [1,n] \)). Matrices \( R \) and \( \hat{A} \) are computationally indistinguishable.

**Proof:** According to Definition 2, we need to show that \( r_{i,j} \) and \( \hat{a}_{i,j} \) (\( \forall i \in [1,m], j \in [1,n] \)) are computationally indistinguishable for matrices \( R \) and \( \hat{A} \) to be computationally indistinguishable. In particular, we show that any probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher \( D \) cannot distinguish \( \hat{a}_{i,j} \) from \( r_{i,j} \) for any \( \forall i \in [1,m], j \in [1,n] \) except with non-negligible success probability.

Recall that values from \( R \) and \( A \) are in the intervals \([-L_j, L_j] \) and \([-K, K] \), respectively. Thus, we have \( \hat{a}_{i,j} \in [-K - L_j, K + L_j] \), and hence \( r_{i,j}, \hat{a}_{i,j} \in [-2^p, 2^\kappa] \) where \( \kappa = p + l + q + 1 \). The best strategy for distinguisher \( D \) when presented with a sample \( x = \hat{a}_{i,j} \) is to return \( b \leftarrow \{0,1\} \) with equal probability if \( -L_j \leq x \leq L_j \), and 1 if \( x < -L_j \) or \( x > L_j \). Therefore, when \( x = \hat{a}_{i,j} \), we have that the success probability of the distinguisher is given by

\[
\Pr[D(\hat{a}_{i,j}) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} \Pr[-L_j \leq \hat{a}_{i,j} \leq L_j] + \Pr[\hat{a}_{i,j} < -L_j] + \Pr[\hat{a}_{i,j} > L_j]
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2} (1 - \Pr[\hat{a}_{i,j} < -L_j] - \Pr[\hat{a}_{i,j} > L_j]) + \Pr[\hat{a}_{i,j} < -L_j] + \Pr[\hat{a}_{i,j} > L_j]
\]

where

\[
\Pr[\hat{a}_{i,j} > L_j] = \Pr[\hat{a}_{i,j} > L_j - a_{i,j}] \\
= \Pr[z_i > L_j - a_{i,j}] \\
\leq \Pr[z_i > L_j - K] \\
= \frac{K}{2L_j}
\]

Similarly, we find that \( \Pr[\hat{a} < -L_j] \leq \frac{K}{2L_j} \). Consequently, we have that the probability of success for distinguisher \( D \), when \( x = \hat{a}_{i,j} \), is bounded as follows:

\[
\Pr[D(\hat{a}_{i,j} = 1)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{K}{2L_j}
\]

On the other hand, if \( x = r_{i,j} \), we can obtain that \( \Pr[D(\hat{a}_{i,j}) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} \).

According to equation (2), for any \( \forall i \in [1,m], j \in [1,n] \) we get that

\[ |\Pr[D(\hat{a}_{i,j}) = 1] - \Pr[D(r_{i,j}) = 1]| \leq \frac{K}{2L_j} \]

Note that \( K = 2^l \) and \( L_j \in [2^{p+l}, 2^{p+l+q}] \). Thus, we have

\[ \mu(\kappa) = \frac{K}{2L_j} \leq \frac{2^l}{2^{p+l}} \leq \frac{1}{2^p} = \frac{1}{2^{\kappa-l-q-1}} \]

which is negligible. By union bound, it completes the proof.

**IV. SECURE OUTSOURCING OF LARGE-SCALE LSEs**

In this section, we develop a practical and light-weight algorithm to securely outsource a large-scale LSE to the SC based on the conjugate gradient method (CGM).

**A. The Conjugate Gradient Method**

We notice that solving the LSE in (1) is equivalent to solving the following unconstrained quadratic program

\[ \min f(x) = \frac{1}{2} x^T A' x - b' x \]

(6)

where \( A' \) is symmetric and positive definite [23]. Therefore, we use the CMG algorithm that solves the above optimization problem to solve (1).

Specifically, as any gradient directions (GD) method, the CGM employs a set of vectors \( P = \{p_0, p_1, \ldots, p_n\} \) that are conjugate with respect to \( A' \), that is, at iteration \( k \) the following condition is met:

\[ p_k^T A' p_i = 0 \text{ for } i = 0, \ldots, k - 1. \]

(7)

Using the conjugacy property of vectors in \( P \), we can find the solution in at most \( n \) steps by computing a sequence of solution approximations as follows:

\[ x_{k+1} = x_k + \alpha_k p_k \]

(8)

where \( \alpha_k \) is the one-dimensional minimizer of (6) along \( x_k + \alpha_k p_k \). The minimizer \( \alpha_k \) can be found by setting (6) to zero and taking its gradient when \( x = x_{k+1} \)

\[ \nabla f(x_{k+1}) = A' x_{k+1} - b' = 0. \]

(9)

By replacing \( x_{k+1} \) with (8) and multiplying by \( p_k^T \) from the left, we get

\[ \alpha_k = \frac{-r_k^T p_k}{p_k^T A' p_k} \]

(10)

where \( r_k = A' x_k - b' \) is called the residual.

Moreover, we can find the residual iteratively based on (8) as follows:

\[ r_{k+1} = A' x_{k+1} - b' = A'(x_k + \alpha_k p_k) - b' = r_k + \alpha_k A' p_k. \]

(11)

Efficiently finding the set of conjugate vectors \( P \) is a major challenge in GD methods. The CGM algorithm offers an efficient way of finding \( P \) that has low storage and computational complexity. In particular, the CGM finds a new conjugate vector \( p_{k+1} \) at iteration \( k \) by a linear combination of the negative residual, i.e., the steepest descent direction of \( f(x) \), and the current conjugate vector \( p_k \), that is,

\[ p_{k+1} = -r_{k+1} + \beta_{k+1} p_k \]

(12)

where \( \beta_{k+1} \) is chosen in such a way that \( p_{k+1}^T A' \) and \( p_k \) meet condition (7). By multiplying \( p_k^T A' \) from the left in (12), we get

\[ p_k^T A' p_{k+1} = -p_k^T A' r_{k+1} + p_k^T A' \beta_{k+1} p_k, \]
which leads to
\[ \beta_{k+1} = \frac{p_k^T A'(p_{k+1} + r_{k+1})}{p_k^T A'p_k} \]

Since as mentioned above \( p_k^T \) and \( p_{k+1}^T \) are conjugate with respect to \( A' \), we have \( p_k^T A' p_{k+1} = 0 \). Note that \( p_k^T A' r_{k+1} \) is a scalar and \( A' \) is symmetric. Thus, we have
\[ \beta_{k+1} = \frac{r_{k+1}^T A' p_k}{p_k^T A' p_k} \] (13)

Moreover, since \( x_k \) minimizes \( f(x) \) along \( p_k \), it can be shown that \( r_k^T p_i = 0 \) for \( i = 0, 1, \ldots, k-1 \) [23]. Using this fact and equation (12), a more efficient computation for (10) can be found, namely,
\[ \alpha_k = \frac{-r_k^T (r_k + \beta_k p_{k-1})}{p_k^T A' p_k} = \frac{r_k^T r_k}{p_k^T A' p_k} \]

Similarly, using (11), we can find a more efficient formulation for \( \beta_{k+1} \). First, we replace \( A' p_k \) with \( \frac{1}{n} (r_{k+1} - r_k) \) in (13) to get
\[ \beta_{k+1} = \frac{r_{k+1}^T (r_{k+1} - r_k)}{p_k^T (r_{k+1} - r_k)} \]

Then, using the fact that \( p_k^T r_{k+1} = 0 \) and \( r_{k+1}^T r_k = 0 \) [23], we find that
\[ \beta_{k+1} = -\frac{r_{k+1}^T r_{k+1}}{p_k^T r_k}. \]

By replacing \( p_k \) with \( -r_k + \beta_k p_{k-1} \) above, and applying \( p_{k-1}^T r_k = 0 \), we get
\[ \beta_{k+1} = \frac{r_{k+1}^T r_{k+1}}{r_k^T r_k} \]

To summarize the above, the CGM algorithm is as follows. At iteration \( k = 0 \), we have
\[ r_0 = A' x_0 - b' \] (14)
\[ p_0 = -r_0 \] (15)
\[ k = 0 \] (16)

and at iteration \( k > 0 \) we have the following iterative equations:
\[ \alpha_k = \frac{r_k^T r_k}{p_k^T A' p_k} \] (17)
\[ r_{k+1} = r_k + \alpha_k A' p_k \] (18)
\[ x_{k+1} = x_k + \alpha_k p_k \] (19)
\[ \beta_{k+1} = \frac{r_{k+1}^T r_{k+1}}{r_k^T r_k} \] (20)
\[ p_{k+1} = -r_{k+1} + \beta_{k+1} p_k \] (21)

Compared to other methods, e.g., Gaussian eliminations, QR decomposition, CGM offers a feasible algorithm for extremely large-scale systems.

B. The Privacy-preserving CGM Algorithm

In what follows, we describe our proposed privacy-preserving CGM algorithm (PPCGM) that exploits the structure of the CGM method to securely shift the relatively more expensive operations, i.e., matrix-vector multiplications, in each iteration to the CS.

1) LSE Transformation: As shown in Section IV-A, the CGM algorithm only works with symmetric and positive definite matrices. Therefore, the CC can transform the original LSE (1) to the following equivalent LSE:
\[ A' x = b' \] (22)

where \( A' = A^T A \) is symmetric and positive definite, and \( b' = A^T b \).

Since computing \( A' \) requires a matrix-matrix multiplication, which has complexity of \( O(n^3) \), the CC can source the computation to the CS. To be more prominent, the CC generates a random matrix \( Z_0 = u_0 v_0^T \) as described in Section III and then sends a masked matrix \( \hat{A}_0 \) to the CS:
\[ \hat{A}_0 = A + Z_0. \] (23)

As proved before, \( \hat{A}_0 \) is computationally indistinguishable from a random matrix and hence does not reveal any information about \( A \). The CS carries out the following secure computation:
\[ G = \hat{A}_0^T \hat{A}_0 = A^T A + M \]

where \( M = Z_0^T A + A^T Z_0 + Z_0^T Z_0 \). Thus, upon receiving \( G \), the CC can obtain the symmetric positive definite matrix \( A' \) by
\[ A' = G - M. \] (24)

To avoid matrix-matrix multiplications in the calculation of \( M \), the CC can replace \( Z_0 \) with \( u_0 v_0^T \), i.e.,
\[ M = v_0 (u_0^T A) + (A^T u_0) v_0^T + v_0 (u_0^T u_0) v_0^T. \] (25)

We summarize this LSE transformation scheme in Algorithm 1. Next, the CC and the CS collaboratively carry out the CGM algorithm to solve \( A' x = b' \). Note that \( A' \) can be calculated just once for many LSEs that share the same \( A' \) but have different \( b' \)s. For example, power system operators solve many state estimation problems for system monitoring and control. These problems have different measurements, i.e., \( b' \)s, but the same \( A' \) which depends on network topology and does not change frequently. Thus, finding \( A' \) once is enough to solve a large number of LSEs.

2) Initialization: In the initialization step, the CC sets the initial solution vector \( x_0 \) to a random vector of \( \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1} \), and tries to compute \( r_0 \) and \( p_0 \) according to equations (14) and (15). Since computing \( A' x_0 \) requires a matrix-vector multiplication, the CC can outsource this computation to the CS.

In particular, the CC generates a masked coefficient matrix \( \hat{A}' = A' + Z \), where \( Z = uv^T \) as described in Section III, and sends it together with \( x_0 \) to the CS. The CS helps the
Algorithm 1 LSE Transformation

**Input:** CC ← A, b
1: Generate matrix Z₀
2: Construct A₀ using (23) and send it to CS
3: Receive G
4: Calculate A' using (24)
5: Calculate b' = A'Tb

**Output:** A', b'

CC compute the term A'x₀ in a privacy-preserving manner by computing the following intermediate value

$$h₀ = A'x₀.$$ 

Upon receiving h₀, the CC computes the residual vector as follows

$$r₀ = A'x₀ - b' = h₀ - u(v^Tx₀) - b'.$$

By computing v^Tx₀ first in equation (26), the CC computes vector-vector computations only, which have linear complexity. This is possible due to the fact that Z is a rank-one matrix and can be decomposed into an outer-vector product. If we had formed Z arbitrarily, the client would not experience any computational or storage complexity gains.

At the end of the initialization step, the client sets the conjugate vector p₀ = −r₀, and transmits it along with r₀ to the CS.

3) **Main Iteration:** Exploring the CGM iteration, i.e., equations (17)-(21), we notice that equations (17) and (18) need matrix-vector multiplications involving the coefficient matrix A', while the rest of the equations only require vector-vector multiplications. We exploit these equations to design an efficient collaborative computation between the CC and the CS, where the CS helps compute (17) and (18), and the CC carries out the rest of the equations by itself. To protect the CC’s privacy, the CS carries out computations with the CC. To carry out equation (17) and (18), the CS helps compute (17) and (18), and the CC computes the term A'x₀ in a privacy-preserving manner by computing the following intermediate value

$$h₀ = A'x₀.$$ 

Note that when calculating α₀ and r₀⁺ we have also used the fact that Z is rank-one to provide computational gains to the CC. That is, the CC carries out the computations of α₀ and r₀⁺ in linear time via vector-vector multiplications.

Equations (19)-(21) only require vector-vector operations, hence they all can be computed entirely by the CC itself. At the end of the kth iteration, the CC transmits p₀⁺ to the CS for the next iteration k + 1. Iterations terminate according to the stopping criteria suggested by Golub and Van Loan [24], i.e., $$\sqrt{r₀⁺^Tr₀⁺} ≤ ν||b'||₂$$, where ν is a tolerance value.

We summarize the PPCGM algorithm for the CC in Algorithm 2. Moreover, we note that since the CS has an economic incentive to allocate less computational resources to the CC and return erroneous solutions, the CC should be able to verify the results from the CS. In particular, at the end of the algorithm the CC can multiply A' by the obtained solution vector x, and compare the product to the constant vector b'. As in [19], the solution vector x can be deemed correct if $$||A'x - b'||₂ ≤ ϵ$$, where ϵ is a small value. Since the result verification is not the main focus of this paper, we refer the readers to other works for more detailed discussions.

Algorithm 2 A Privacy-Preserving Conjugate Gradient Method (PPCGM)

**Input:** CC ← A', b'
1: Generate u, v, and Z using (5)
2: Calculate A' = A' + Z and transmit it and x₀ to the CS
3: Receive h₀
4: Calculate r₀ using (26) and p₀ = −r₀, and transmit to cloud
5: while $$\sqrt{r₀⁺^Tr₀⁺} ≤ ν||b'||₂$$ do
6: Receive t₀ and f₀
7: Compute α₀ using (28)
8: Compute r₀⁺ using (29)
9: Compute x₀⁺, β₀⁺, p₀⁺ using (19), (20) and (21), respectively.
10: Transmit p₀⁺ to cloud
11: end while

**Output:** xₙ

V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

In this section we analyze the computational and memory I/O complexity of the proposed PPCGM algorithm, and compare them with those of the previous works. We also present a thorough privacy analysis. Note that previous works can only work with square coefficient matrices. To perform fair comparisons, we assume that they employ our proposed Algorithm 1 to securely transform an arbitrary coefficient matrix into a square matrix.

A. Computational Complexity

We define the computational complexity of a party as the number of floating-point (flops) operations (additions, subtractions, multiplications, and divisions), bitwise operations, and encryptions that the party needs to perform. We note that an
encryption takes many flops, and a flop takes some bitwise operations. To determine the overall computational complexity for the client in PPCGM, we look into Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 in detail.

If the original coefficient matrix is not symmetric and definite positive, the CC runs Algorithm 1 to construct such a matrix in equation (22). To this end, the CC computes 4 matrix-matrix additions and subtractions \((mn+3n^2)\), 2 matrix-vector products \((2n(2m-1))\), 3 outer vector products \((3n^2)\), 1 inner vector product \((2m-1)\), and 1 scalar-vector product \((n)\), which takes \(6n^2+5mn+2m-n-1\) flops.

In line 1 of Algorithm 2, the client generates the random vector \(u\) and the random matrix \(Z\). To get \(u\), the client uses a pseudo-random number generator like the Mersenne Twister [25], which takes a constant number of bitwise operations per random number. To get \(Z\), the client multiplies \(u\) times the vector of constants \(v^T\) via \(n^2\) flops. We assume the constants in \(v\) are pre-chosen by the client. In line 2, the client constructs the transformed coefficient matrix \(\hat{A}'\) through a matrix addition, which takes \(n^2\) flops. Thus, the total number of operations required to get \(\hat{A}'\) is \(2n^2\) flops and \(Cn\) bitwise operations, where \(C\) is the number of bitwise operations needed to generate a random number. In line 4, the client computes \(r_0\) through one vector-vector multiplications \((2n-1)\), one vector-scalar multiplication \((n)\), and two vector-vector subtractions \((2n)\), which takes \(5n-1\) flops in total. Note that \(p_1\) can be computed by the CS. The total computational complexity of the initialization phase for the CC is \(2n^2+5n-1\) flops plus \(Cn\) bitwise operations.

To find \(\alpha_k\) in line 7, according to equation (28), the client performs 4 vector-vector multiplications \((4(2n-1))\), a scalar subtraction, and a scalar division, which has a total of \(8n-2\) flops. In line 8, the client performs 1 vector-vector multiplication \((2n-1)\), 2 vector-scalar multiplications \((2n)\), and 2 vector-vector additions \((2n)\) to find \(r_{k+1}\). This computation has a cost of \(6n-1\) flops. Similarly, we observe \(x_{k+1}, \beta_{k+1}, p_{k+1}\) need \(2n, 4n-1,\) and \(2n\) flops, respectively. Totally, the client performs \(22kn-4k\) flops after \(k\) iterations.

Thus, the total computational complexity of the PPCGM algorithm is \(O(mn)\) flops plus \(O(n)\) bitwise operations.

In the scheme proposed by [17], an arbitrary coefficient matrix needs to be transformed into a square invertible matrix first, which takes \(6n^2+5mn+2m-n-1\) flops. Then, a client encrypts its coefficient matrix by multiplying it with two permutation matrices, which takes \(2n^2\) flops. Similarly, the client performs \(2n^2\) multiplications to decrypt the received inverse matrix. To solve an LSE the client performs an additional matrix-vector multiplication. Thus, the total computational complexity is \(12n^2+5mn+2m-2n-1\), i.e., \(O(mn)\), flops.

The secure outsourcing proposed in [19] requires a client to perform a problem transformation that takes one diagonal matrix inversion, a matrix-vector multiplication, the multiplication of diagonal matrix and a matrix with a zero diagonal, the multiplication of a diagonal matrix and a vector, and an additive homomorphic encryption of the elements of the coefficient matrix. These operations take a total of \(3n^2-n\) flops plus \(n^2\) homomorphic encryptions. Then in each iteration the client decrypts a vector and performs a vector addition, which takes \(n\) flops and \(n\) decryptions. Considering the transformation of an arbitrary coefficient matrix into a square matrix, the total computational complexity for this work is \(O(mn)\) flops plus \(O(n^2)\) encryptions.

B. Memory I/O Complexity

As mentioned before, to better capture the external memory I/O requirement of large-scale LSEs, we propose a new definition of external memory I/O complexity, which is the number of values that are read/written from/into external memory. The memory I/O complexity of the proposed scheme is analyzed as follows. If the original LSE system is not symmetric and positive definite, the CC runs Algorithm 1, which needs to read the original coefficient matrix and the constant vector, and write the new coefficient matrix and the new constant vector. These operations take \(mn+n+n^2+n\) I/O operations.

In line 2 of Algorithm 2, to construct \(\hat{A}'\), the CC reads \(A'\) and writes \(\hat{A}'\) to external memory, which takes \(2n^2\) I/O operations. Computing \(r_0\) requires one read of \(b'\) which takes \(n\) I/O operations. In the main iteration phase, the CC is able to make all of its operations within the RAM memory. At the final iteration, the CC stores the solution \(x^*\) into the external memory, which takes \(n\) I/O operations. Therefore, the total memory I/O complexity of our scheme is no more than \(3n^2+mn+m+3n\).

In [17], the CC hides its coefficient matrix using permutation matrices. It needs one read of \(A'\) and one write of the resulting matrix, i.e., \(2n^2\) I/O operations. The client decrypts the received inverse matrix similarly, which takes another \(2n^2\) I/O operations. To find the solution vector, the CC performs a read of the inverse matrix and vector \(b'\) and a write of the final solution, which takes \(n^2+2n\) I/O operations. Note that as mentioned above, transforming an arbitrary coefficient matrix and the corresponding constant vector incurs \(mn+m+n^2+n\) memory I/O operations. The memory I/O complexity in [17] for general matrices is thus \(6n^2+mn+m+3n\).

In [19], the CC protects its data by transforming the problem through a matrix transformation, which takes \(3n^2+n\) I/O operations, and then encrypting the coefficient matrix, which takes additional \(2n^2\) I/O operations. We consider that the CC performs all the computations during iterations within its RAM memory, and at the final iteration stores the result in the external memory, which takes \(n\) I/O operations. Similarly, considering the memory I/O operations incurred by transforming an arbitrary coefficient matrix and the corresponding constant vector, the total memory I/O complexity for the CC is \(6n^2+mn+m+3n\) I/O operations.

A summary of computational and memory I/O complexity comparison between our algorithm and previous works is also shown in Table I. Note that previous works assume square matrices in their complexity analysis. Although we have analyzed the complexities of several existing schemes, to facilitate more inclusive comparison, we consider square matrices as well, i.e., \(m = n\).
The results are summarized in Table II. We observe that the CC complete the computations in each iteration of both algorithms. Thus, we compare the time that the CC takes to the cloud by outsourcing matrix-vector computations. We compare our results to the iterative algorithm in [19] with 768-bit encryptions, which is their best performing case. We also observe that the CS is unable to derive information about the solution vector \( \hat{\mathbf{x}} \) and the conjugate vector \( \hat{\mathbf{r}} \). Specifically, to calculate \( \hat{\mathbf{x}} \) even if the CS stores \( \hat{\mathbf{A}} \), because \( \hat{\mathbf{A}} \) is kept private by the CC. Moreover, from (18), \( \hat{\mathbf{r}} \) also remains unknown from the CS since it would need the coefficient matrix \( \hat{\mathbf{A}} \) to find it.

In addition, by keeping \( \alpha_k \) and \( \mathbf{r}_k \) private, the CC also prevents the CS to learn about the vector \( \mathbf{b} \) and hence \( \mathbf{b} \). We also note that different from [19] where privacy can only be protected if the algorithm converges within \( n \) iterations, the privacy in our algorithm can be protected no matter how many iterations are needed.

### VI. Experimental Results

In this section, we evaluate the computational and memory I/O complexity of the proposed scheme for secure outsourcing of large-scale LSEs. We implement both the CC and the CS parts of the algorithm in Matlab 2013b. We run the CC on a laptop with a dual-core 2.4GHz CPU, 4GB RAM memory, and a 320GB hard disk at 5,400RPM. The CS is implemented on Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). As explained in Section IV-B3, transforming \( \mathbf{A} \) into \( \mathbf{A}' \) can be done just once for many LSEs. Therefore, we focus on the performance of solving \( \mathbf{A}' \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{b} \) with coefficient matrices of dimension \( n \times n \), with \( n \) ranging from 5,000 to 30,000.

We first explore the computing time of our algorithm, in which the CC shifts most of the computational burden to the cloud by outsourcing matrix-vector computations. We compare our results to the iterative algorithm in [19] with 768-bit encryptions, which is their best performing case. We notice that [19] employs the Jacobi method to solve diagonally dominant matrices, which may not converge when applied to a general matrix. Thus, we compare the time that the CC takes to complete the computations in each iteration of both algorithms. The results are summarized in Table II. We observe that the CC is able to complete each iteration much faster in our scheme than in [19]. For example, in the case when \( n = 5,000 \) the CC in our algorithm completes an iteration in only 0.7ms, while it takes 27s in [19], a difference of five orders of magnitude. We also notice that as the dimension of the matrix increases, our performance gain is even more obvious. This is due to the use of regular arithmetic in our scheme but the use of the computationally expensive homomorphic decryptions in [19].

We then evaluate the total memory I/O complexity of our algorithm. Again, since [19] may not converge when applied to a general matrix, we compare such cost of our scheme with that of [17]. We can see from Table III that our algorithm has much lower memory I/O cost compared to [17], which is consistent with our I/O complexity analysis. For example, when \( n = 5,000 \), the CC’s total memory I/O access time is 3.4 minutes in our scheme while 6.0 minutes in [17]. When \( n \) goes to 30,000, the CC’s total memory I/O access time is 64.7 minutes in our scheme while 171.3 minutes in [17]. This shows a significant difference, i.e., up to 62% time saving in our algorithm.

We also explore the total running time of the proposed algorithm in Table IV. We disregard the communication time with the cloud so that we can focus on the total computing and memory I/O access time. We observe that the total running time savings offered by our algorithm are very attractive. For example, in the case of \( n = 5,000 \) our scheme solves the large-scale LSE in 3.6 minutes, while the scheme in [17] takes 6.2 minutes, indicating 42% time saving in our algorithm. Moreover, in the case of \( n = 30,000 \), the total running time of our algorithm is 66.9 minutes, compared to a total of 192.7

#### TABLE I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Computational Complexity</th>
<th>Memory I/O Complexity</th>
<th>Matrix Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gennaro et. al [14]</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(n^2) ) FHE cryp ops</td>
<td>( 6n^2 + 4n ) I/O ops</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang et. al [15]</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(n^2) ) flops</td>
<td>( 6n^2 + 4n ) I/O ops</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lei et. al [17]</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(n^2) ) flops</td>
<td>( 8n^2 + 4n ) I/O ops</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attallah et. al [18]</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(n^2) ) flops</td>
<td>( 8n^2 + 4n ) I/O ops</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang et. al [19]</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(n^2) ) flops + ( \mathcal{O}(n^2) ) crypt ops</td>
<td>( 7n^2 + 4n ) I/O ops</td>
<td>Diagonally Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our scheme</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(n^2) ) flops + ( \mathcal{O}(n) ) bit ops</td>
<td>( 3n^2 + 4n ) I/O ops</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matrix Size</th>
<th>Our Algorithm</th>
<th>[19]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n = 5,000</td>
<td>0.70 ms</td>
<td>27.82 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 8,000</td>
<td>0.72 ms</td>
<td>46.06 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 10,000</td>
<td>0.76 ms</td>
<td>66.32 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 30,000</td>
<td>1.50 ms</td>
<td>121.81 s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### TABLE III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matrix Size</th>
<th>Our Algorithm</th>
<th>[17]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n = 5,000</td>
<td>3.4 min</td>
<td>6.0 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 8,000</td>
<td>13.5 min</td>
<td>23.6 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 10,000</td>
<td>14.2 min</td>
<td>24.8 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 15,000</td>
<td>23.4 min</td>
<td>40.8 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 30,000</td>
<td>64.7 min</td>
<td>171.3 min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Privacy Analysis

Exploring the PPCGM algorithm proposed in Section IV, we observe that the CS only has access to the transformed coefficient matrices \( \hat{\mathbf{A}} / \hat{\mathbf{A}}' \) and the conjugate vector \( \mathbf{p}_k \). According to Theorem 1, the transformed matrices \( \hat{\mathbf{A}} / \hat{\mathbf{A}}' \) are computationally indistinguishable from a random matrix. Thus, the CS cannot derive any information about the elements of coefficient matrices \( \mathbf{A} / \mathbf{A}' \) from the transformed matrices \( \hat{\mathbf{A}} / \hat{\mathbf{A}}' \).

We also observe that the CC is unable to derive information about the solution vector \( \mathbf{x}_k \). Specifically, to calculate \( \mathbf{x}_k \), the CC needs the knowledge of \( \alpha_k \), which is calculated with \( \mathbf{r}_k \). However, the CC keeps \( \alpha_k \) and \( \mathbf{r}_k \) private. We also note from (21) that even if the CC stores \( \mathbf{p}_k \) for all \( k \), it cannot calculate \( \mathbf{r}_k \) because \( \beta_k \) is kept private by the CC. Moreover, from (18), \( \mathbf{r}_k \) also remains unknown from the CC since it would need the coefficient matrix \( \mathbf{A}' \) to find it.

In addition, by keeping \( \alpha_k \) and \( \mathbf{r}_k \) private, the CC also prevents the CS to learn about the vector \( \mathbf{b} \) and hence \( \mathbf{b} \). We also note that different from [19] where privacy can only be protected if the algorithm converges within \( n \) iterations, the privacy in our algorithm can be protected no matter how many iterations are needed.
minutes in [17]. Thus, our algorithm achieves as high as 65% time saving, which is very impressive. In addition, from Table III and Table IV, we can tell that memory I/O operations lead to a very significant part of the total running time, which shows the impact that memory I/O complexity has on the overall algorithm performance. Therefore, low I/O complexity is indispensable for a practical outsourcing algorithm.

We finally plot Fig. 2 to more clearly compare the total running time of our algorithm with that of [17]. In accordance to our theoretical results, we observe that the total running time in each algorithm grows quadratically as the dimension of the coefficient matrix \( n \) increases. We also notice that the time saving of our algorithm becomes more and more significant compared to that of [17] as \( n \) increases.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have investigated the problem of securely outsourcing large-scale LSEs. In particular, to protect the cloud client’s privacy, we develop a privacy-preserving matrix transformation based on linear algebra and show that the resulting matrix is computationally indistinguishable from a random one. Then, we propose an algorithm based on the conjugate gradient method that can solve large-scale LSEs efficiently while preserving the client’s privacy. Formal analysis shows that our proposed algorithm has much lower computational and memory I/O complexities than previous works, and protects the client’s privacy well. We finally conduct extensive experiments on Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and find that our algorithm offers significantly less total running time compared to previous works.

REFERENCES


TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF TOTAL RUNNING TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matrix Size</th>
<th>Our Algorithm</th>
<th>[17]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( n = 5,000 )</td>
<td>3.6 min</td>
<td>6.2 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n = 8,000 )</td>
<td>13.7 min</td>
<td>24.6 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n = 10,000 )</td>
<td>14.5 min</td>
<td>25.7 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n = 15,000 )</td>
<td>22.9 min</td>
<td>45.0 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n = 30,000 )</td>
<td>60.9 min</td>
<td>192.7 min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2. The total running time of our algorithm compared with that of [17].